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After rising 19% from 1938 to 1939, 15% from 1939 to1940, and
17% from 1940 to 1941, our index of industrialmaterials produc-
tion did not rise at all from 1941 to 1942.Similarly, it rose 10% from
1914 to 1915 and 15% from 1915 to 1916,but only 4% from 1916
to 1917; and it declined 4% from 1917 to 1918.The retardations can
be dated more precisely from the monthlyindexes in Table 2.20 The
rapid expansion in the production of industrialmaterials ended by
June 1941, and production has remainedsubstantially at the June
1941 level for more than two years.The highest points to date were
reached in November 1941, January 1942, andFebruary 1943. Thus
production of materials leveled off 21 monthsafter the start of the
war and 6 months before theUnited States entered it, with no sub-
stantial change since. In the first war therapid expansion in industrial
materials ended by December 1915, 16 monthsafter the start of the
war and 16 monthsbefore our entry, and production wasmain-
tained at approximately the December 1915level for almost three
years. The high point wasreached in May 1917.21
In both wars, then, the rapid expansionin the production of mate-
rials ended prior to our entry, and wasfollowed by a period of little
change in level. The group indexesin Table 4 indicate that in both
wars the decline in the rateof growth was general. All groups except
nondurable commodities, products of foreignorigin, fuels, and mis-
cellaneous increased less rapidly ordecreased more rapidly from
1916 to 1917 than from 1914 to 1915 or1915 to 1916. All groups
except manufactured foodsincreased less rapidly or decreased more
rapidly from 1917 to 1918 than from 1914 to 1915,1915 to 1916,
or 1916 to 1917.Similarly, all the indexes rose less rapidly ordeclined
more rapidly from 1941 to1942 than from 1940 to 1941,and all
except one, manufacturedfoods, rose less rapidly or declined more
rapidly from 1941 to 1942 than from 1939 to1940. The year to year
201n annual form these indexescorrespond quite closely to ours. The percentage
changes in the annual averages ofthe current Federal Reserve Board indexexduding
manhours series, 1938-39 tc 1941-42, are 22, 12, 19,2; for the early Federal Reserve
Board index, 1914-15 to 1917.18, they are 12, 19.2, 5. Cf. Chart 2.
21 The index for the first war leveled off 12 monthsafter it began to rise (Dec. 1914)
and reached a peak after 29 months ofexpansion. The index for the second war started
to rise in June 1938 andleveled off 36 months later. Whether or not apeak has yet
been reached, the current expansion hasalready lasted longer than the expansion in
the first war.S
directions of change of the 47 individualcommodities also indicate
generality of retardation in the twowars. Whereas 87% of thecorn.
modities (95% in terms of theirimportance in our mdcx in1914)
increased in output from1915 to 1916, only 57% (66on a weighted
basis) did in 1916-17, and in1917-18 there was a definitepreponder.
ance of declines (Table 8 and Chart 5). Indeed,the figures for
1917-18 closely resemble those for1913-14. In 1940-42 thedecline in the proportion of commoditieswhose output increasedwas similar to that in 1915-17; thepercentage dropped fromover 90 in 1940-41to 68 in 1941-42.
TABLE 8
Distribution of 47 Industrial MaterialsSeries according to
Direction of Change from Yearto Year, 1913-18, 1937-42
%of
Total CL %of
lotal Number Number Weight Number Number Weights 191 3-14 17.5 37.2 22.5 29.5 62.8 191 4-15 30.5 64.9 64.0 16.5 35.1 36.1 191 5-16 41 87.2 95.0 6 12.8 5.0 1916-17 27 57.4 66.1 20 42.6 1917-18 17 36.2 32.6 30 63.8 67.4 1937-38 10 21.3 7.9 37 78.7 92.1 193 8-39 35 74.5 92.1 12 25.5 1939-41,) 37.5 79.8 91.9 9.5 20.2 8.1 1940-41 44 93.6 97.5 3 6.4 2.5 1941-42 32 68.1 68.5 5 31.9 31.5
Computed from data inAppendix Tables 1 and3. Entries for series that donot change are distributed equally betweenthe rise and falI'columns. * 1914 weightsfor 1913-1g 1939weights for 1937-42.
If for each of thecommodities wecompare the later with theearlier rates of changewe find only ninecommodities (anthracite,petroleum, sulphur, rubberimports, cannedcorn, cannedpeas, milk, cattle slaughter, and calvesslaughter) whosepercentage changes from 1916 to 1917 were higher(algebraically) thanin either of thetwo pre- ceding yearlyintervals (1914-15and 1915-16); for29 commodities they were lower.In only twocolmnodjtjes (hogsslaughter and sheep slaughter)were the rates of changehigher in 19 17-18than in any of the three precedingyearly intervals;in 27 therates were lower. Simi- larly, in thesecond war onlyeight commodities(aluminum,mag- nesiuln, anthracite,alcohol,turpentinecanned tomatoes,calves slaughter, and sheepslaughter) registeredlargerpercentage increases
26
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(or smaller decreases) in 1941-42 than in 1939-40or 1940-41, while
21 registered smaller increases (or larger decreases).
If the retardation in the output of materialswere confined to a few
products, to products of little significance in thewar effort, or to
products whose output might reasonably be expectedto increase sub-
stantially after a short recession, the phenomenon wouldnot be im-
portant. But Table 8 and Chart 5 demonstrate that theoutput of more
than a third of the commodities shrank from1941 to 1942 andmany
others increased less rapidly than in previousyears. Also, while among
the few products whose output expandedat an accelerating rate
through 1942 some are of great importanceto the war effort (suchas
aluminum and magnesium), the rate ofexpansion of many vitalwar
materials, such as steel and petroleum, slackenedappreciably. Finally,
consideration of the kinds of commoditiesaffected and the factors
underlying their behavior indicates that thereis little reason toexpect
the retardation to be short-lived and thatit will soon be succeededby
a substantial advance.
It is true that a considerablepart of the retardation in thetotal
is attributable to the decline in importsfrom 1941 to 1942, andthat
the output of products manufacturedfrom imported materialsmay
expand as the shipping situationimproves and as weopen up sources
of supply now closedto us or develop substitutesources. However,
the index of products of domesticorigin also shows retardation,rising
13% from 1939 to 1940 and 17% from1940 to 1941, but only
6% from 1941 to 1942. Onecomponent of this index, construction
materials, would showa decline from 1942 to 1943. Itrose less than
1 per cent from 1941 to 1942 afterincreasing 11 and 19% in1939-40
and 1940-41, and thereare other definite indications that thewartime
peak in construction activityhas been passed."
The current and prospectivedecline in Constructionsuggests that
limited plant capacity,one of the factors that undoubtedlycontributed
to the retardation in theoutput of industrial materials, willcontinue
to be effective. At the beginningof both warsmore industrial mate-
2Z Employment inconstruction work, according to theseasonally adjusted figures of the Federal Reserve Board, reacheda peak in February 1941, but didnot decline appre- ciably until the beginning of1943; by July 1943, however, it haddeclined to a level 44% below the 1942 average. Thevalue of constitJon contracts,also according to the seasonally adjusted indexof the Federal Reserve Board,reached a peak in July 1942, and the level in July1943 was 64% below the 1942average. Finally, the sea- sonally adjusted Federal Reserveindexes of lumber andcement production reached peaks in August 1941 andOctober 1942, respectively, andthe July 1943 indexes were 9 and 30% below the 1942averages (cf. Chart 6).
28
evials could be produced relatively easily without expanding physical
plant, since much plant capacity was then underutilized (cf. Table 3)
The rapid initial increase in production is attributable, at least in part,
to the utilization of this idle capacity. As the expansion proceeded,
however, it must have become more and more difficult to augment
production without expanding plant. In both wars, apparently, new
plant in the industries producing industrial materials represented rela-
tively small additions to total plant capacity. These industries are for
the most part old and well established, and constitute a rather large
segment of total industry. Most of the new construction of plantand
equipment during the wars was in industries producing finished muni-
tions rather than in industries producing basic materials. Steel ingot
capacity, for example, expanded 8% from 1939 to 1942, or21/2%
per year; the capacity of active bituminous coalmines expanded7%
from 1914 to1918,or i½% per year. In general it seems thatin
neither war was the expansion of capacity in these industries sufficient
to maintain a high rate of increase in production.
While plant capacity can limit the expansion of production, itis not
likely to bring about a decline. Another factor that has a controlling
influence in both directions is manpower. Although we have noindex
of employment comparable with our production index, themonthly
production and employment series assembled in Chart 6 represent
most of the industries in our index (annual seriesof approximately
the same coverage as the monthly production series receive81% of the
weight in our index in 1939)We find that:
2 The exact titles of the monthly series in the latest of the original sources (Federal
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+ (31) Eleven industries have eitheralready reached a definitepeak in
production (judging from the duration,size, and continuity ofthe
subsequent decline), or show amarked decline in the rate of increase
in output (suggesting that theindicated high point may be theactual
peak, or at least is not far below it).
In nine of these industries adefinite peak in employment
has been reached: lumber,leather, paper and pulp, metalmining,
cement, tobacco, textiles,ferrous metals, and bituminouscoal.
In two there is no definitepeak or retardation in employ-
ment: malt liquorsand flour.
2) Three industries show nodefinite peak or retardation in pro-
duction.
In two of these a definitepeak in employment hasbeen
reached: petroleum and meatpacking.
In one there is rio definitepeak or retardation in employ-
ment: nonferrousmetals.
Despite some rather glaringdifferences in the behavior ofthe pro-
duction and employmentseries, due partly to our failure toseasonally
adjust the employmentseries, partly to lack ofcomparability in
coverage, andpartly to longer hours ofwork, the relation between
employment and production inthese basic industries seemsclear. In
all except three of the14 industries (malt liquors,flour, and non-
ferrous metals) employmenthas declined considerablyfrom the
levels reached in 1941 or 1942.Unless these declines arechecked, a
substantial rise in the totalproduction of industrialmaterials seems
very unlikelyand a moderate decline not atall unlikely. The latter
outcome would notbe without precedent; ourindex declined 4%
from 1917 to 1918.
IV INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS
OUTPUT AND TOTAL INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION IN PEACE ANDWAR
In Section I we madecertain tests of thevalidity of our industrial
materials production index,but deferred considerationof the relation
between the output ofindustrial materials andtotal industrial pro.
duction. Obviously therewould be little point in theforegoing.analYsis
if no relation were tobe expected. However,total industrial produc-
tion depends not only onthe output of materialsbut also on the rate
at which they areconsumed and on the amountof labor and other
factors of productionapplied to them. In thissection we attempt to
31